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Indexation of the personal tax code for price-level  changes represents 
one of the most significant elements of U.S. tax legislation in the 1980s. 
However,  because the indexation  provisions do not adjust personal tax-rate 
schedules contemporaneously,  bracket indexation remains incomplete.  This 
paper argues that,  even ignoring the remaining problems associated with 
capital-income  measurement,  depreciation provisions, and so on,  the potential 
distortionary costs of inflation/tax-system interactions remain high. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmI.  Introduction 
For most of the American experience with a federal income 
tax, the U.S.  economy has operated under a nominally based tax 
system.  The essential characteristic of a nominal tax system is 
the designation in dollar terms of rate brackets, exemption 
levels, and other items that figure into the definition of 
taxable income. 
The past decade, however, has seen an important and 
historically unique development in the structure of the U.S. 
personal tax system.  By the beginning of the 1980s, it was clear 
that distortions created by  interactions between the tax system 
and the high inflation rates of the 1970s had exacted significant 
costs on the economy.  The political recognition of this fact 
resulted in the introduction of limited indexation of the 
personal tax code by way of automatic inflation adjustments 
legislated in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), 
provisions that were maintained by  the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA86)  . 
The double-digit inflation rates of the years immediately 
preceding passage of ERTA were, by  contemporary American 
standards, extraordinary, and by  1986 the inflation rate had 
fallen substantially.  U-S. inflationary experience in the post- 
ERTA years has, in fact, differed markedly from the experience of 
the decade prior to enactment of this legislation.  From 1971 
through 1981, annual inflation rates averaged 6.3  percent as 
measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index 
for all urban wage earners (CPIU).  The standard deviation of the 
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through 1989, however, the inflation rate averaged 3.7  percent, 
with a standard deviation of only 1.09  percent.  Although the oil 
shock of late 1990 has resulted in a significant departure from 
this pattern, most forecasts for 1991 suggest that the rate of 
inflation will return to a level more consistent with recent 
history. 
The coincidence of improvements on the inflation front and 
introduction of indexing into the tax code has significantly 
colored recent monetary policy debates.  Conventional wisdom, as 
represented by the arguments typically presented to undergraduate 
students in economics courses, holds that the most significant 
costs of inflation are associated with inflation uncertainty and 
with tax distortions introduced by interactions between price- 
level growth and nominal tax  system^.^  Thus, even prior to the 
recent economic downturn, the combination of several years of 
modest, relatively stable inflation and indexing of the personal 
tax code had provided a powerful case for maintenance of the 
status quo with respect to current Federal Reserve policy, 
including the "inflation targetsw implied by the Fed's  stated 
goals for monetary-aggregate gr~wth.~  By extension, these 
factors have contributed to skepticism about the value of a zero- 
inflation target, especially among those who are convinced that 
achieving zero inflation would impose short-run costs by 
inhibiting economic activity. 
Has indexation substantially mitigated the costs of 
inflation?  Perhaps.  But the arguments presented in this paper 
assert that, even ignoring issues such as nonindexation of 
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distortions created by  the collection of seigniorage, the costs 
of anticipated inflation remain high. 
In particular, because indexation of the tax code is not 
contemporaneous, the problem of @@bracket  creep,@@  or the tendency 
of inflation to push taxpayers into higher rate brackets without 
concomitant increases in real income, has not been entirely 
eliminated by  the indexing provisions in the current tax code. 
Thus, even when viewed in the most favorable light possible, the 
task of indexing the tax code is seen as far from complete. 
Introducing additional problems such as the nonindexation of 
capital income, which is considered in the penultimate section of 
this paper, simply reinforces the bracket-creep effects that 
still exist. 
11.  The Indexing Provisions of ERTA and TRA86 
Indexation of the personal tax code formally commenced in 
1985 under provisions of ERTA.  Ad hoc indexation, in the form of 
infrequent adjustments of nominal tax brackets, personal 
exemption levels, and so on, was periodically legislated prior to 
1985, but ERTA represented the first time that regular, ongoing 
inflation adjustments were codified in the tax laws. 
Under ERTA, indexation required annual adjustments in the 
dollar value of tax-bracket limits and personal exemption levels 
based on a cost-of-living index derived from the CPIU.  ERTA 
defined the cost-of-living index as the average CPIU for the 12- 
month period ending September 30 of the year prior to the tax 
year, divided by  the average CPIU for the analogous period in 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm1984.  Thus, because tax years and "index yearsn were not 
synchronized, ERTA mandated that inflation adjustments be made 
with an approximate lag of one year.' 
To give a specific example, the cost-of-living index for 
1986 was calculated by dividing the average CPIU for the period 
spanning October 1984 through September 1985 by  the average CPIU 
for the period spanning October 1983 through September 1984. 
Tax-bracket limits and personal exemption levels for tax year 
1986 were then adjusted by multiplying the statutory bracket 
limits and personal exemption levels in effect for the 1984 tax 
year by the resulting cost-of-living index. 
Although the indexing provisions of ERTA were in effect for 
only two years before being superseded by TRA86, the new 
legislation extended the ERTA indexing scheme  with only minor 
modifications.  The first of these modifications arose because 
TRA86 eliminated the zero-bracket amount of taxable incomee6  To 
compensate, personal exemption levels, the standard deduction 
level, and the earned-income tax credit for low-income taxpayers 
were increased.  In conjunction with these changes, TRA86 also 
extended inflation indexing to the standard deduction and the 
earned-income credit. 
The second modification involved minor changes in the way 
the cost-of-living index is calculated.  This index is now 
derived by  dividing the average CPIU for the 12-month period 
ending August 31 of the year prior to the relevant tax year by 
the average CPIU for the corresponding period ending August 31, 
1987. 
The indexing provisions of TRA86 are currently in force. 
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Record 
Figure 1 plots both the actual annual inflation rate between 
1971 and 1989, as measured by the December over December change 
in the CPIU, and the annual "index inflation ratew  that would 
have been applied to tax brackets had the indexing provisions of 
ERTA been in effect during this period.  As suggested above, the 
time path of the index inflation rate looks very much like the 
time path of the actual inflation rate displaced by one year. 
Discrepancies between the actual and index inflation rates 
depicted in figure 1 reflect the dual effects of inflation 
variability and the technical construction of the cost-of-living 
index.  Because of variability in realized inflation rates, the 
pictured relationship between actual and index inflation rates is 
characterized by  years in which overindexation has (or  would 
have) occurred, as well as by years in which underindexation has 
(or  would have) occurred.  Thus, in some years adjustments to 
bracket limits exceed the actual rate of inflation, and in some 
years indexing adjustments fall short of actual inflation. 
The technical issue arises because the inflation-rate 
adjustment is not strictly a one-year lag of the inflation rate, 
but,  as explained in section 11, a rate constructed using the 
average of the CPIU over the 12-month period ending 15 months 
(for  ERTA) or 16 months (for  TRA86) prior to the relevant tax 
year.  Thus, although the annual year-end to year-end growth rate 
of the CPIU was essentially constant at 4.4  percent from 1987 
through 1989, the ERTA index adjustments would have been 2.1 
percent in 1987, 3.2  percent in 1988, and 4.1  percent in 1989.' 
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taxpayer given the indexing history shown in figure l?  A back- 
of-the-envelope answer to this question is shown in figures 2 and 
3, which depict hypothetical time series for the average marginal 
tax rate under three distinct rate-structure  assumption^.^  The 
chosen rate schedules include one from the pre-ERTA period 
(1971), one from the post-ERTA/pre-TRA86  period  (1982), and one 
from the post-TRA86 period (1989).' 
Figure 2 depicts simulated average marginal tax rates in the 
absence of indexation.  Specifically, the hypothetical series in 
figure 2 were generated as answers to the following question: 
What effect would our actual inflationary experience from 1971 
through 1989 have had on the average taxpayer's marginal tax rate 
assuming that (a)  the average taxpayer is one of a family of 
four, claims slightly more than the standard deduction allowable 
in the 1971tax  code, and faces the statutory rate schedule for 
married persons filing jointly; (b) real income remained 
unchanged; (c) the particular tax-rate structure, the 
distribution of pre-tax personal income, and the ratio of taxable 
to nontaxable income remained unchanged;''  and  (d)  perfect 
indexation (that is, indexation with no lag) was applied to  the 
dollar amounts of personal exemption and deduction levels, but 
not to marginal tax-rate brackets?  In addition, the series in 
figures 2 and 3 abstract from capital-income mismeasurement 
problems that arise due to the inappropriate calculation of real 
asset income under nominal tax systems.  We discuss the capital- 
income mismeasurement issue in more detail in section V. 
The average marginal tax rates depicted in figures 2 and 3 
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rates. The weights for each bracket were constructed as the 
within-bracket share of adjusted gross income on all returns for 
married persons filing jointly in 1971. We obtained the necessary 
data from the 1971 Statistics of Income, published by the 
Internal Revenue Service. To provide a consistent basis for 
comparison, the dollar values of the bracket limits for the 1982 
and 1989 rate schedules were converted to 1971 values using the 
CPIU . 
The intercept, or benchmark, of each of the series shown in 
figure 2 reflects the zero-inflation average marginal tax rate. 
Of the three tax structures considered, the 1982 schedule has the 
highest rates and the 1989 schedule has the lowest rates.  This 
ordering also reflects the sensitivity of each of the schedules 
to bracket creep.  Relative to the zero-inflation benchmark, the 
cumulative effect of inflation/tax-system interactions increases 
the average marginal tax rates by  37.6  percent for the 1982 
schedule, 31.2  percent for the 1971 schedule, and 25.2  percent 
for the 1989 schedule. 
We do not suggest that these numbers reflect actual changes 
in average marginal tax rates from 1971 through 1989.  The 
assumptions used in the calculations are clearly counterfactual, 
and the absence of indexation for exemption levels, deduction 
levels, and capital-income mismeasurement clearly results in an 
understatement of the effect of inflation on tax liabilities.  On 
the other hand, ignoring factors such as the deductibility of 
nominal interest expense and periodic ad hoc indexation, such as 
the increased dollar values of rate brackets instituted by the 
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understatement. 
Nonetheless, the series plotted in figure 2 do provide 
convenient reference points for rough calculations of the 
potential quantitative effects of the ERTA and TRA86 indexing 
schemes.  Figure 3 depicts hypothetical paths for the 1971-1989 
average marginal tax rates assuming that the ERTA indexing 
provisions had been in effect.  Like the experiments depicted in 
figure 2, these hypothetical time series use historical 
realizations of inflation and are constructed for the 1971, 1982, 
and 1989 rate structures under the set of assumptions described 
above. 
The results are fairly dramatic.  Independent of the rate 
structure used, figure 3 shows that the inflation-induced drift 
in average marginal tax rates seen in figure 2 is substantially 
reduced when indexing is introduced in the manner provided by  the 
current U.S.  tax code.  For example, using the 1989 rate 
structure, the cumulative effect of bracket creep increases the 
1989 average marginal tax rate by  just 1.3  percent relative to 
the zero-inflation benchmark. 
An interesting feature of the series in figure 3 is that the 
calculated average marginal tax rates for 1986 are only slightly 
above the benchmark values for each of the rate structures 
considered.  This result reflects the dramatic decline of annual 
inflation rates realized between 1981 and 1986.  A pure one-year- 
lag indexation scheme effectively adjusts nominal taxable income 
in year t  , relative to year t-1, by  (r,,,-n,)/  (l+~,,,)  percent.  l1 
It  is clear from this expression that, with no real income 
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rates of inflation. It is this phenomenon that is reflected in 
figure 3's  decreasing average marginal tax rates for the first 
half of the 1980s. 
In fact, with the ERTA indexation scheme, the average 
marginal tax rate for 1986 fell to a level nearly consistent with 
zero inflation, even though the actual inflation rate for that 
year was not zero.  This is surprising because, in the simplified 
world considered here, a pure one-year-lag  indexation scheme will 
cause taxable income to be overstated by the current rate of 
inflation. 
To provide a concrete example, suppose that a tax-rate 
schedule set at time zero is given by 
Marginal 
Tax Rate  Tax Bracket 
Suppose further that the price level increases by  1+r in year 1 
and every year thereafter.  Then the sequence of marginal tax 
rates faced by  an individual with a constant real income equal to 
Y is given by 
Nominal  Real 





Thus, taxable income is overstated by r percent every period. 
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is not strictly based on a one-year lag of inflation, but on 
average inflation at lags of 15 months (for  ERTA) and 16 months 
(for  TRA86).  By chance, the 1986 inflation rate implied by the 
ERTA indexing provisions exceeded the one implied by a strictly 
12-month indexing lag.  Consequently, by chance, the average 
marginal tax rate calculated for 1986 is only slightly above the 
value calculated for the zero-inflation benchmark. 
IV.  Haa Tax Reform Eliminated Bracket Creep as an Economic 
Problem? 
For the hypothetical taxpayer in the preceding example, 
sustained inflation permanently increases his or her marginal tax 
rate, even though nominal income brackets are eventually adjusted 
for price-level changes.  More generally, in a steady state with 
lagged indexation and a constant inflation rate g,  taxpayers' 
taxable income will be overstated in every period by #  percent. 
Thus, although the indexation scheme does not entirely eliminate 
the problem of bracket creep, it does bound the effects. 
The obvious question is whether the residual effects of 
bracket creep are small enough to  conclude that indexation has 
effectively eliminated the problem.  This is of particular 
interest because the CPIU growth rate has rarely deviated by more 
than half a percentage point from 4 percent since 1982.  The 
question can be usefully framed as follows: Given a steady-state 
inflation rate of 4 percent, have the indexing provisions of ERTA 
and TRA86 effectively eliminated distortionary costs associated 
with bracket creep?  We claim that the answer is no. 
In related research, we compared the long-run distortionary 
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distortionary effects of raising the same amount of revenue 
through proportionately increasing statutory marginal tax rates. 
The analysis uses a general-equilibrium overlapping-generations 
model, similar to that of Auerbach and Kotlikoff  (1987), in which 
individuals face a tax-rate structure and indexing scheme 
patterned after ~~86.  l2 
The results of this research suggest that, even with the 
relatively favorable provisions of TRA86, raising revenue through 
bracket creep is less efficient than the hypothesized alternative 
of changing the structural tax rates.  With a steady-state rate 
of inflation equal to 4 percent, the distortionary effect of 
bracket creep reduces simulated long-run annual output by about 
1.2  percent relative to the case in which equal revenues are 
raised by a proportionate increase in the marginal tax-rate 
schedule.  To put this number into perspective, 1.2  percent of 
real GNP in 1989 was $48 billion (in 1982 dollars). 
~lternatively,  relative to an equal-revenue tax regime with 
zero inflation, taxation based on the interaction of the tax code 
and a 4 percent annual steady-state inflation rate results in a 
welfare loss equivalent to a 0.1  percent reduction in total 
wealth per person.  A 0.1  percent reduction would amount to 
approximately $1500 per person (in 1982 dollars; the 
corresponding figure in 1989 dollars would be approximately 
$1900).  l3 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmV.  Braoket Creep and Capital-Income Nismeasurement 
Implicitly, the discussion thus far has proceeded as if 
taxable income is calculated in the following way:  First, an 
individual's  real income is determined.  Second, this figure is 
multiplied by  one plus the rate of inflation to obtain nominal 
income.  Marginal tax rates are then determined on the basis of 
an index inflation rate being applied to this measure of nominal 
income. 
The actual procedure, of course, omits the first step: 
Nominal taxable income is obtained directly and then deflated 
according to the index rate in order to  determine the appropriate 
tax liability.  Although the difference in these two procedures 
is not critical for the calculation of real wage income, real 
capital income cannot be obtained by simply deflating nominal 
capital income by l+n. 
To provide an example of this capital-income mismeasurement 
problem, suppose that an individual has total nominal income 
given by  Y=W+R-A,  where W is the total nominal wage payment and R 
is the nominal rate of return on asset holdings A. 
Contemporaneous bracket indexation would effectively deflate Y by 
1  But this is clearly inappropriate for measuring real 
capital income.  Because real asset income is given by 
(R-17)  .  A/ (l+r)  ,  simply dividing R-  A by one plus the inflation rate 
would result in an overstatement of capital income equal to 
s.  A/ (l+a)  . 
The capital-income mismeasurement problem is logically 
distinct from the bracket-creep problem per se:  Although 
distortions from bracket creep would vanish under a flat-tax 
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remain.  On the other hand, capital-income mismeasurement will 
generally contribute to overall bracket-creep effects. 
Accordingly, figure 4 depicts experiments analogous to those in 
figures 2 and 3, but includes capital-income mismeasurement. 
Figure 4 traces out five distinct experiments based on the 
post-TW86 tax code.  Two of the pictured series simply 
replicate, for reference, the simulated average marginal tax 
rates for the 1989 tax c.ode  shown in figures 2 and 3.  These 
series, represented by  the broken lines in figure 4, abstract 
from capital-income mismeasurement. 
The series represented by  solid lines in figure 4 include 
the effects of capital-income mismeasurement.  Three separate 
cases are considered: one with no indexing of any sort (the Itno 
inflation adjustmenttt  case), one with the indexing scheme 
specified by  ERTA (the  It lagged inflation adjustmenttt  case)  ,  and 
one with nominal income deflated by  the actual current inflation 
rate (the ttcurrent  inflation adjustmenttt  case)  . 
The calculations in this section assume that taxable asset 
income is distributed uniformly over all taxpayers and is 
proportional to total taxable income.  We obtained asset levels 
from both the 1963 and 1983 Survev of Consumer Finances, 
conducted by  the Federal Reserve System  (see Avery, Elliehausen, 
and Kennickell [1988]).  Taxable assets are defined here as total 
assets exclusive of the value of owner-occupied real estate, 
state and local obligations, home mortgages,  installment credit, 
and other debt.14  For both the 1963 and 1983 surveys, the ratio 
of our taxable asset measure to personal income is 1.2. 
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income mismeasurement, while increasing the level of effective 
tax rates, does not substantially change the effects of bracket 
creep, with or without the type of indexation mandated by  ERTA 
and TRA86. 
It is interesting to note that the series of tax rates with 
capital-income mismeasurement and current inflation adjustment is 
quite similar to the series with lagged inflation adjustment and 
no capital-income mismeasurement, with the simulated rates in the 
former being sometimes higher and sometimes lower than the in 
latter.  This feature also reflects the fact that our lagged 
inflation adjustment does not strictly correspond to a one-year 
lag of the actual inflation rate.  If it did, the series with 
capital-income mismeasurement would always lie above the series 
that abstracts from capital-income mi~measurement.'~ 
VI.  concluding Remarks 
This discussion has focused primarily on the issue of 
bracket creep in the context of the indexing provisions in the 
current U.S.  tax code.  Our motivation for this emphasis is 
straightforward.  Bracket indexation is the only element of 
recent tax reforms to address directly the potential distortions 
created by  interaction of inflation and the tax code. 
It is important to stress, however, that many potential 
sources of distortionary inflation/tax-system interactions 
remain.  One particularly significant source of such interactions 
-- capital-income mismeasurement -- is briefly discussed in the 
previous section.  For example, we note that Altig and Carlstrom 
14 
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estimate back-of-the-envelope magnitudes of the economic costs 
arising through nonindexation of capital income.  Representative 
numbers in that study suggest that with 4 percent annual steady- 
state inflation, distortions arising from the overstatement of 
capital income cause long-run annual output losses of between 
$2.80  and $4.50  for every dollar of revenue gained. 
The message from these observations is clear.  Although the 
indexing schemes introduced by ERTA and TRA86 represent progress, 
the issue of inflation/tax-system interactions is far from moot. 
Consequently, discussions about the costs and benefits of 
monetary policy goals, or, more specifically, the costs and 
benefits of particular inflation targets, must necessarily take 
these factors into consideration. 
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1.  An  early review of the indexing provisions contained in 
ERTA can be found in Tatom (1985)  . 
2.  The consensus Blue Chip forecast for the fourth-quarter 
to fourth-quarter percentage change in the CPIU for 1991 was 4.0 
percent as of January 1991.  The DRI forecast for the same period 
was 3.4  percent, while the median forecast of the January Fourth 
Federal Reserve District Economists@  Roundtable was 3.9  percent. 
We thank Michael Bryan for providing us with these numbers. 
3.  Familiar presentations of this position are found in 
Fischer (1981)  and Fischer and Modigliani (1978). 
4.  The target range for M2 growth was 3 to 7 percent for 
both 1989 and 1990.  According to Chairman Greenspants  July 1990 
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony, the projected target range for 1991 
is 2.5  to 6.5  percent. 
5.  An  "index yearv@  is referred to in ERTA as a "calendar 
year.@@ This terminology is somewhat misleading in that ERTA1s 
reference to a calendar year does not correspond to a 12-month 
period that spans January to December.  Tax years, on the other 
hand, correspond to the usual January to December calendar year. 
6.  The zero-bracket income level was defined as the 
positive taxable income level below which the marginal tax rate 
was zero. 
7.  In addition to reflecting the effect of ending the index 
year in August of the previous year, these numbers include the 
impact of using an average 12-month CPIU to obtain the cost-of- 
living index.  Using the one-year lag in August over August 
changes in the CPIU would yield annual index inflation rates of 
1.8  percent for 1987, 4.2  percent for 1988, and 4.3  percent for 
1989. 
8.  The analysis here focuses entirely on inflation-induced 
increases in effective marginal tax rates.  It is of course true 
that the bracket-creep effects we consider will also raise 
average tax rates.  For some problems, such as the indivisible 
labor problem studied by  Hansen (1985), the average tax rate may 
be the more relevant variable.  We are grateful to an anonymous 
referee for bringing this point to our attention. 
9.  The 1971 schedule had 24 rate brackets and a top 
marginal tax rate of 70 percent. The 1982 schedule had 12 
brackets and a top marginal tax rate of 50 percent.  Simplifying 
somewhat, TRA86 further reduced the number of tax brackets to 
four and the top marginal tax rate to 33 percent. The exact 
determination of marginal tax-rate brackets under TRA86 is 
complicated by  the phaseout of personal exemptions at higher 
income levels.  For simplicity, the post-TRA86 rate schedule 
assumed for the experiments depicted in figures 2 and 3 was 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmderived from published rates for taxable incomes below $155,320 
(Schedule  Y-1 in the Instructions,  Internal Revenue 
Service) and from the assumption of a 28 percent marginal tax 
rate for all income above $155,320. 
10.  The calculations assume that real, pre-tax income is 
uniformly distributed in each of the relevant adjusted gross 
income brackets. 
11.  Holding real income fixed, ignoring deductions and 
exemptions, and ignoring capital-income mismeasurement problems, 
nominal income grows by  1+~,.  With a pure lagged-indexation 
scheme, income is deflated for tax purposes by the term l+r,-,. 
Thus, the percentage change in indexed taxable income is obtained 
by  solving for x from the expression l+x=  (l+r,) /  (l+r,-,). 
12.  Specifically, the analysis assumes a piecewise linear 
marginal tax-rate schedule with minimum and maximum rates of 15 
and 28 percent.  The numbers reported in this section update 
calculations originally reported in Altig and Carlstrom (1990). 
13.  An individual's  full wealth is defined here as the 
present value of his or her maximum labor income. We estimate 
full wealth by assuming a maximum daily time endowment of 16 
hours, an economic life span of 55 years, real wage growth of 2 
percent per year, and an annual after-tax discount rate of 4 
percent.  We use the average weekly real wage for all production 
and nonsupervisory workers in 1989 to obtain a dollar figure for 
an individual's time endowment. 
14.  The subtraction of owner-occupied real estate and state 
and local debt obligations reflects the fact that most of the 
income from these assets is nontaxable.  The subtraction of the 
last.  three categories reflects the deductibility of interest 
payments associated with home mortgages and other consumer debt. 
Although the interest on nonmortgage consumer debt was only 
partially deductible from 1987 to 1989, this category was small 
relative to total consumer debt (see  Altig  [1990]). 
15.  Real income at time t is given by y,=(W+  (R-r,) A)/ (l+r,) , 
where, again, W is nominal wage payments and A is taxable assets. 
Recall Prom section I11 that an indexing scheme that adjusts 
nominal income with a lag of exactly one year overstates real 
income by R,  percent in year t.  Because A=1.2-y, taxable income 
at time t under such an indexing scheme would be yt(l+rt+1.2rt). 
With lagged inflation adjustment and no capital-income 
mismeasurement, taxable income would be y,(l+r,).  With current 
inflation adjustment and capital-income mismeasurement, taxable 
income would be y,.  1. 2~,. 
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Actual and Index. 1971  -1989 
Source:  Bureau of Labor  Statistics. 
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